Abstract: In this paper, we extended the work about public key encryption schemes supporting fine-grained authorization (FG-PKEET), done by Tang (2011b). First of all, we correct some flaws in Tang (2011b) and discuss how to extend the proposed cryptosystem to support approximate equality test. Secondly, we present a comparison between FG-PKEET and other similar primitives including AoN-PKEET by Tang (2011a) and PKEET by Yang et al. (2010) , and demonstrate their differences in complexity and achieved security. Thirdly, to mitigate the inherent offline message recovery attacks, we extend FG-PKEET to a two-proxy setting, where two proxies need to collaborate in order to perform an equality test. Finally, we propose a cryptosystem and prove its security in the two-proxy setting.
Introduction
Data and computation oursourcing is becoming a popular trend due to the potential economic benefits. For such applications, it is a big challenge to design mechanisms, which simultaneously achieve the intended business objectives and provide a maximal level of privacy guarantee on the sensitive data. Recently, a lot of research efforts have been dedicated to cryptographic techniques supporting operations on encrypted data. In this paper, we are interested in Public Key Encryption schemes which support Equality Test between ciphertexts, which is generally referred to as PKEET.
As mentioned by Yang et al. (2010) , PKEET is a useful building block in constructing secure solutions for outsourced databases. Besides, we can foresee more applications in the emerging computing scenarios. For example, Tang (2011a) shows that a special variant of PKEET cryptosystem (i.e. AoN-PKEET) can allow patients to encrypt their attributes and a semi-trusted proxy to match the encrypted attributes and recommend the patients to each other in an Internet-based PHR application by Sittig (2002) .
Related Work
The concept of PKEET cryptosystem was proposed by Yang et al. (2010) , and their formulation lacks an authorization mechanism for users to specify who can perform equality test between their ciphertexts. In reality, any entity can perform the equality test. As a result, standard semantic security or IND-CPA security cannot be achieved. A serious consequence is that, if the message space is polynomial size or the min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower than the security parameter, then any entity can potentially mount an offline message recovery attack. This attack is similar to the offline keyword guessing attack in the case of PEKS (or searchable encryption) by Byun et al. (2006) ; Tang and Chen (2009) . Tang (2011a) extends the concept of PKEET, and introduces an authorization mechanism for users to specify who can perform a plaintext equality test from their ciphertexts. The new primitive is denoted as AoN-PKEET. With an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem, every user can independently run an authorization algorithm to issue his token to some semi-trusted proxies. If a proxy receives the tokens from both Alice and Bob, then it is able to perform a plaintext equality test from their ciphertexts; otherwise, it cannot do so.
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• A user has tight control over with whose ciphertexts that her ciphertexts can be tested with, by choosing with which user to run the authorization algorithm.
The concepts of PKEET has a close nature to that of Public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) Boneh et al. (2004b) and public key encryption with registered keyword search (PERKS) Tang and Chen (2009) . With a PEKS or PERKS scheme, a user can enable a server to perform equality test between the keyword embedded in a trapdoor and a tag (attached to a ciphertext), and the user enforces her authorization by issuing a trapdoor to the server. In particular, Hwang and Lee (2007) extend PEKS to a multi-user setting, where the tag contains keywords encrypted under a group of users' public keys. Compared with these primitives, PKEET in general (namely PKEET, AoN-PKEET, and FG-PKEET) is different in the sense that it aims at equality test between the plaintexts of any number of ciphertexts, while the PEKS and related primitives aim at testing the equality of keyword(s) in a given trapdoor and multiple tags.
Our Contribution
This paper is an extended work based on that by Tang (2011b) . The contributions lie in four aspects. First of all, we correct some flaws in the description of proposed cryptosystem and its security proofs by Tang (2011b) . In addition, we discuss how to extend the proposed cryptosystem to support approximate equality test based on the Euclidean distance metric. Secondly, we present a comparison between FG-PKEET and other similar primitives including AoN-PKEET by Tang (2011a) and by PKEET Yang et al. (2010) , and demonstrate their differences in complexity and achieved security. Thirdly, to mitigate the inherent offline message recovery attacks, we extend FG-PKEET to a two-proxy setting, where two proxies need to collaborate in order to perform an equality test. we present a security model to formalize a set of security properties which are similar to those of FG-PKEET. Finally, we propose a cryptosystem based on the FG-PKEET cryptosystem proposed by Tang (2011b) , and prove its security in our security model.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the concept of FG-PKEET. In Section 3, we propose an FG-PKEET cryptosystem and prove its security. In Section 4, we describe two relevant properties for FG-PKEET cryptosystems, namely resistance to offline message recovery attacks and approximate equality test support. In Section 5, we compare FG-PKEET with PKEET and AoN-PKEET. In Section 6, we extend FG-PKEET to two-proxy setting, propose a cryptosystem and prove its security. In Section In Section 7, we conclude the paper.
Formulation of FG-PKEET
In this section, we first provide a formal description for FG-PKEET, and then present the security model.
Throughout the paper, we use "||" to denote the concatenation operator and use x ∈ R X to denote that x is chosen from X uniformly at random.
Description of FG-PKEET
An FG-PKEET cryptosystem consists of algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Aut, Com), where (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) define a standard public key encryption scheme while (Aut, Com) define the equality test functionality.
• KeyGen( ): This algorithm takes a security parameter as input, and outputs a public/private key pair (P K, SK) . Let M denote the message space.
• Enc(M, P K): This algorithm takes a message M ∈ M and the public key P K as input, and outputs a ciphertext C.
• Dec(C, SK): This algorithm takes a ciphertext C and the private key SK as input, and outputs the plaintext M or an error message ⊥.
Let all the potential users be denoted as U i (1 ≤ i ≤ N ), where N is an integer, and they adopt the above public key encryption scheme. For any i, suppose that U i 's key pair is denoted as (P K i , SK i ). Suppose that U i and U j want to enable a proxy to perform equality test between their ciphertexts, the Aut and Com algorithms are defined as follows.
• Aut(SK i ; SK j ; ·): This algorithm is interactively run among U i , U j and the proxy, and the two users use their private keys as their secret inputs. At the end of the algorithm execution, the proxy receives a token T i,j as the output, while U i and U j receive no explicit output.
• Com(C i , C j , T i,j ): This algorithm takes two ciphertexts C i , C j and the token T i,j as input, and outputs 1 if M i = M j or 0 otherwise. Note that
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C i , C j are two ciphertexts encrypted under P K i and P K j respectively.
In the algorithm definitions, besides the explicitly specified parameters, other public parameters could also be specified and be implicitly part of the input. We omit those parameters for the simplicity of description. Note that, under our definition of Aut, T i,j and T j,i are exactly the same thing.
It is worth noting that the Aut algorithm is supposed to run interactively among two users and the proxy. The interactive nature of this algorithm may seem to be a drawback, but it in fact reflects the process that the two users together authorize the semi-trusted proxy to perform equality test between their ciphertexts. Moreover, this algorithm only needs to be run once for any selected proxy, which will then be able to compare all ciphertexts of the two users. Therefore, the interactive nature of the the Aut algorithm will not be a performance bottleneck in practice.
Similar to other cryptographic primitives, the basic requirement for FG-PKEET is soundness. Informally, this property means that the algorithms Dec and Com work properly with valid inputs. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1: An FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves (unconditional) soundness if the following two equalities hold for any i, j ≥ 1 and
is equal to 1 if M = M , and 0 otherwise.
Remark 2.1: In the definitions of Aut and Com, we implicitly assume that i = j because, for the moment, we are only interested in testing the equality of the ciphertexts of two different users. This implies that, for a secure FG-PKEET cryptosystem, with a token T i,j , the proxy may be able to test the equality of two ciphertexts of U i . For example, in the proposed FG-PKEET cryptosystem in Section 3, the token T i,j actually allows the proxy to perform equality test between the ciphetrexts of U i . Arguably, this may be regarded as a potential vulnerability or be a violation of the expected fine-grained authorization capability. In Section 6, we will extend the concept of FG-PKEET into a two-proxy setting, where we will take this issue into account in more detail.
The Security Model
Before describing the security model for FG-PKEET, we first informally distinguish three common trust assumptions used in formulating security properties of cryptographic protocols.
• The first and strongest trust assumption is fully trusted. If Alice is fully trusted in a protocol, then she will faithfully follow the protocol specification and do nothing else.
• The second trust assumption is semi-trusted or honest-but-curious. If Alice is semi-trusted in a protocol, then she will faithfully follow the protocol specification and may try to deduce some private information from the transcripts of protocol execution. However, Alice will not act malicious in order to gain more benefits. For example, Alice will not try to collude with another party.
• The third and weakest trust assumption is untrusted. If Alice is untrusted in a protocol, then she is supposed to do everything in order to gain some private information.
To facilitate our formal discussions, we make the following assumptions.
1. First of all, all users honestly generate their public/private key pairs and the execution of the Aut algorithm will be carried out through secure channels between the involved entities.
2. Secondly, the proxies are semi-trusted (or, honestbut-curious) to the users who have chosen them. They will faithfully follow the protocol specifications, but will try to deduce some information from the acquired data. In addition, one proxy can serve multiple pairs of users to perform equality test.
3. Thirdly, there is no overlap between the user set and the proxy set, namely no user will be allowed to act as a proxy for another two users. This will greatly simplify our discussion.
With respect to an FG-PKEET cryptosystem, for an honest user U t , where 1 ≤ t ≤ N , we consider two categories of adversaries, namely Type-I and Type-II adversaries as illustrated in Figure 1. 1. Type-I adversary represents the semi-trusted proxies with which U t has run the algorithm Aut with. Referring to Figure 1 , Proxy I and Proxy L are Type-I adversary.
2. Type-II adversary represents all possibly malicious entities in the system from the perspective of U t , namely
In fact, all proxies with which U t has not run the algorithm Aut should also be regarded as a malicious adversary, because U t do not even semi-trust them. For example, Proxy T in Figure 1 is such an entity. However, taking them into account will not give the Type-II adversary extra power, so that we simply ignore them. As to a Type-I adversary, it is involved in the executions of the Aut algorithm as the proxy with U t , and obtains the tokens, and it may also obtain some information about U t 's plaintexts through accessing U t 's decryption oracle. Clearly, in the presence of a Type-I adversary, standard indistinguishability notions, such as IND-CCA and IND-CPA, cannot be achieved. Referring to Figure 1 , given Enc(M t , P K t ), Proxy L is able to test whether M t is equal to any M . Since the proxy has been authorized by U t and U k together, to do so, it just needs to run a test between Enc(M t , P K t ) and Enc(M, P K k ). Against a Type-I adversary, we consider the following two security properties.
1. OW-CCA (i.e. one-wayness under a chosen ciphertext attack), which implies that an adversary cannot recover the plaintext from a ciphertext C * t = Enc(M t , P K t ) even if it is allowed to query the decryption oracle with any ciphertext except for C * t . This is the best achievable security guarantee considering the desired equality test functionality.
2. Fine-grained authorization property, which means that if two users have not authorized a proxy to perform equality test between their ciphertexts then the proxy should not be able to do so. Referring to Figure 1 , U t and U n have not authorized Proxy L to perform equality test between their ciphertexts, so that it should not be able to do so even if U t has authorized it to perform equality test between her ciphertexts and those of U j and U k . It is worth noting this is an analog to the collusion resistance property in the attribute-based encryption schemes by Sahai and Waters (2005) .
As to the power of a Type-II adversary, it is involved in the executions of the Aut algorithm as the other user with U t , so that it may learn some information about U t 's private key. Moreover, it may also obtain some information about U t 's plaintexts through accessing U t 's decryption oracle. In the presence of a Type-II adversary, we define the standard IND-CCA security.
Note that it is straightforward to define the CPA security by simply disallowing the adversary's access to the Dec oracle in the attack games, so that we omit the details in this paper.
OW-CCA Security against a Type-I Adversary
Definition 2.2: An FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves OW-CCA security against a Type-I adversary, if, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ N , any polynomial-time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the attack game shown in Figure 2 , where the advantage is defined to be
1. The challenger runs KeyGen to generate public/private key pairs (
2. Phase 1: The adversary is allowed to issue the following types of oracle queries.
(a) Dec query with data C as input for the index i: the challenger returns Dec(C, SK i ).
(b) Aut query with two integer indexes i, j (i = j) as input: the challenger runs the Aut algorithm with the adversary which plays the role of the proxy.
At some point, the adversary asks the challenger for a challenge for an index t. It is worth noting that, strictly speaking, the notion of OW-CCA is neither weaker nor stronger than IND-CPA given by Bellare et al. (1998) . One one hand, an IND-CPA secure scheme may not be OW-CCA. For instance, many homomorphic encryption schemes, such as the Elgamal scheme by ElGamal (1984) and the Paillier scheme by Paillier (1999) , are IND-CPA but they are clearly not OW-CCA. On the other hand, an OW-CCA secure scheme may not be IND-CPA. For instance, the scheme proposed in Section 3 is OW-CCA but it is not IND-CPA. 1. The challenger runs KeyGen to generate public/private key pairs (
Fine-grained authorization property
At some point, the adversary sends two integer indexes t, w to the challenger for a challenge. In this phase, the Aut oracle should not have been queried with two integer indexes t, w (t = w).
Challenge phase:
The challenger randomly chooses two different messages M 0 , M 1 from M and a random bit b. In the attack game, it is clear that b = 0 (b = 1) implies the challenge ciphertexts do (not) contain the same plaintext. As a result, the adversary's ability of determining b is equivalent to determining the equality of ciphertexts of U t and U w . The adversary is not allowed to access T t,w because we assume the adversary is not authorized by U t and U w to perform the equality test.
Note the fact that a FG-PKEET cryptosystem can only achieve OW-CCA but not IND-CPA or IND-CCA. If the adversary is allowed to choose M 0 , M 1 in the game, then it can trivially win the game. Therefore, different from a typical IND (indistinguishability) security definition, where the adversary is allowed to choose M 0 , M 1 , in this game the challenger chooses both messages.
IND-CCA Security against a Type-II Adversary
Definition 2.4: An FG-PKEET cryptosystem achieves IND-CCA security against a Type-II adversary, if, for any 1 ≤ t ≤ N , any polynomial-time adversary has only a negligible advantage in the attack game shown in Figure 4 , where the advantage is defined to be
(a) KeyRetrieve query with an integer index i as input: the challenger returns SK i to the adversary.
(b) Dec query with data C as input for the index i: the challenger returns Dec(C, SK i ).
(c) Aut query, defined as below.
At some point, the adversary sends an integer index t and two messages M 0 , M 1 from M to the challenger for a challenge. In this phase, the adversary's activities should adhere to the following criteria.
(a) The KeyRetrieve oracle should not have been queried with the index t.
(b) For any i = t, the adversary is allowed to issue Aut oracle queries with indexes i, t as input, where the adversary plays the role of U i .
Challenge phase:
The challenger selects b ∈ R {0, 1} and sends C * t = Enc(M b , P K t ) to the adversary.
Phase 2:
The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle queries as in Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary's activities are subject to the restrictions described in Phase 1, together with the following one: The Dec oracle should not have been queried with the data C * t and index t. At some point, the adversary terminates by outputting a guess b . In this game, the challenger generates all key pairs while the adversary is allowed to adaptively retrieve all private keys except SK t . This formulation faithfully describe the power of a Type-II adversary in our security model, as defined in Section 2.2. In particular, the adversary is allowed to issue Aut oracle queries, which reflects the fact that U t may interactively run the Aut algorithm with a Type-II adversary. A PKEET is IND-CCA secure against a Type-II adversary implies that, for U t , the execution of the Aut algorithm leaks no information to other users.
A New FG-PKEET Cryptosystem

Description of the Cryptosystem
The proposed cryptosystem has
as the global parameters which are defined as follows.
1. is the security parameter, G is a multiplicative group of prime order p, g is a generator of G, and
and G 2 are multiplicative groups of prime order q, and they have g 1 and g 2 as their generators respectively.
* → G 1 are two cryptographic hash functions, where m is a polynomial in , {0, 1} m is the message space and d 1 is the bit-length of p.
Remark 3.1: To satisfy the hardness assumptions required in Section 3.2, a Type-2 or Type-3 pairing setting as mentioned by Boyen (2008) is sufficient. A Type-2 setting means that there should be no efficiently computable homomorphism from G 1 to G 2 . A Type-3 setting means that there should be no efficiently computable isomorphism between G 1 and G 2 .
In a PKEET cryptosystem, a ciphertext allows the receiver to decrypt and also allows a proxy to perform equality test. Hence, the intuition behind our construction is to integrate some extra components into a standard public key encryption scheme, so that these components will facilitate the equality test functionality. Specifically, in the encryption algorithm of the proposed scheme described in next subsection, the extra components are C (2) and C (4) .
The Public Key Encryption Scheme
With the above global parameters defined, we first define the public key encryption algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec).
• KeyGen( ): This algorithm outputs a private key SK = (x, y), where x ∈ R Z p and y ∈ R Z q , and the corresponding public key is
. Note that the message space is M = {0, 1} m .
• Enc(M, P K): This algorithm outputs a ciphertext
• Dec(C, SK): This algorithm first computes
, and then check the following
If all checks pass, output M , otherwise output an error message ⊥.
Suppose that every user U i , for 1 ≤ t ≤ N , adopts the above public key encryption scheme. To facilitate our description, we use the index i for all the variables in defining U i 's data. For example, U i 's key pair is denoted as (
i ) is written in the following form.
The Token Generation Algorithm
Suppose that U i and U j want a proxy to perform equality test between their ciphertexts, then they run the following Aut algorithm to generate the token T i,j for the proxy.
•
) for the proxy. In more details, the token is interactively generated as follows.
U i and U
to the proxy, and U j sends g yj ri,j 2 to the proxy.
Note that, there can be many different ways for U i and U j to generate r i,j in implementing this algorithm. For instance, they can use a interactive coin flipping protocol, such as that by Blum (1983) . Or, simply they can exchanges two nonces and set r i,j to be the hash value of them. In addition, the security properties will not be affected if U j is required to send g r i,j 2 to the proxy.
The Equality Test Algorithm
Suppose a proxy has received the token T i,j , then it can run the following Com algorithm to perform equality test between the ciphetexts C i and C j , which are encrypted under P K i and P K j respectively.
• Com(C i , C j , T i,j ): This algorithm outputs 1 if x i = x j or 0 otherwise, where
In this construction, the group G can be any multiplicative group which holds the CDH assumption. In face, it can be set to be G 1 or G 2 , in which case p = q. We keep it the present way for a general construction. For the proposed cryptosystem, the token T i,j actually allows the proxy to perform equality test between the ciphetrexts of U i (and also U j ).
Security Analysis
In this section, we first prove that the proposed cryptosystem in Section 3 is secure in our security model. Then, we show how to improve its security against a Type-I adversary.
Preliminary.
Following the work by Bellare and Rogaway (1993) , we use random oracle to model hash functions in our security analysis. A function P (k) : Z → R is said to be negligible with respect to k if, for every polynomial f (k), there exists an integer N f such that
We say that the CDH (computational Diffie-Hellman) assumption holds in G of prime order p if, given g a , g b where g is a group generator and a, b ∈ R Z p , an adversary has only a negligible advantage in computing g ab . We say that the DDH (decisional Diffie-Hellman) assumption holds in G 1 of prime order q, if an adversary has only a negligible advantage in distinguishing (g
where g 1 is a group generator and a 1 , b 1 , c 1 ∈ R Z q . In the pairing setting, namely there is an efficient and non-degenerate bilinear mapê : G 1 × G 2 → G T , the DDH assumption in G 1 is also referred to as the XDH (external Diffie-Hellman) assumption given by Boneh et al. (2004a) .
In order to prove the fine-grained authorization property, we need a new assumption, referred to as extended DBDH (decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman) assumption. Let a pairing setting beê :
where the order of groups is a prime q. The extended DBDH problem is formulated as follows.
1. The challenger selects g 1 , g 4 , g 5 ∈ R G 1 , and g 2 , g 3 ∈ R G 2 , and x 1 , y 1 , ∈ R Z q , and α, β ∈ R G 1 . The challenger flips a coin b ∈ R {0, 1} and sends X b to the adversary, where
The extended DBDH problem is at most as hard as the XDH problem in a Type-2 or Type-3 pairing setting mentioned by Boyen (2008) . In other words, if there is an algorithm to solve the XDH problem then there must be an algorithm to solve the extended DBDH problem, but it is not clear whether the vise-versa is true. Nonetheless, similar to the proof of the implicit XDH assumption given by Ballard et al. (2005) , we can show the extended DBDH assumption is hard in the generic group model. We leave the details to the full paper.
Proof Results.
It is straightforward to verify that the soundness property is achieved, namely the Dec and Com work properly. We skip the details here.
Theorem 1: The proposed FG-PKEET cryptosystem is OW-CCA secure against a Type-I adversary in the random oracle model based on the CDH assumption in G.
Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary has the advantage in the attack game shown in Figure 2 . The security proof is done through a sequence of games by shoup (2006) .
Game 0 : In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol execution and answers the oracle queries from the adversary, and all hash functions are treated as random oracles.
Game 1 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 0 except that the following. For any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec with C i , the challenger
i . If the verification fails, return ⊥. Then, the challenger checks whether there exists an input query C
i . If such an input query exists, return M i ; otherwise return ⊥. Let the event Ent 1 be that, for some 
Game 2 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 1 except that, for any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec with C i , the challenger does the following. Try to obtain the query to the oracle H 1 with the input C
i .
If such a query cannot be found, return ⊥. Otherwise, return M i . This game is indeed identical to Game 1 . Let
Game 3 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 2 except that the challenge C * t is generated as follows.
This game is identical to Game 2 unless the event Ent 2 occurs, namely g u t x t is queried to the random oracle H 2 . Note that the private key x t is never used to answer the adversary's queries. Therefore, Pr[Ent 2 ] is negligible based on the CDH assumption in G. Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary has the advantage in the attack game shown in Figure 3 . The security proof is done through a sequence of games by shoup (2006) .
Game 0 : In this game, the challenger faithfully simulates the protocol execution and answers the oracle queries from the adversary, and all hash functions are treated as random oracles. Let 0 = Pr [b = b] . Clearly, 0 = holds.
Game 1 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 0 except that the following. For any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec with C i , the challenger computes
If such an input query exists, return M i ; otherwise return ⊥. Let the event Ent 1 be that, for some 
i ,
i . If such a query cannot be found, return ⊥. Otherwise, return M i . This game is indeed identical to Game 1 . Let
Game 3 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that as in Game 2 except the following. The challenge C * t is generated as follows.
t ||M t ||u t ). The challenge C * w is generated as follows. C
(1) ), where r ∈ R Z q , and does something similar to answering the query with the input i, w. Let 4 = Pr [b = b] in this game. It is clear that this game is identical to Game 3 , therefore 4 = 3 holds.
Game 5 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 4 except the following. The challenge C * t is generated as follows.
The challenge C * w is generated as follows.
The value of X is set to be k t if b = 0, and otherwise set to be k w which is randomly chosen from Z q . Let (g
It is straightforward to prove that to distinguish the above tuples is equivalent to distinguishing the extended DBDH tuples. Therefore, similar to proving semantic security of ElGamal scheme by shoup (2006), it is straightforward to verify that 5 − 1 2 is negligible based on the extended DBDH assumption.
From the above analysis, we have that Game 1 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 0 except that the following. For any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec with C i , the challenger computes
and verifies
i . If such an input query exists, return M i ; otherwise return ⊥. Let the event Ent 1 be that, for some Game 2 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 1 except that, for any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec with C i , the challenger does the following. Try to obtain the query to the oracle H 1 with the input C
t ||M b ||u t ). This game is identical to Game 2 unless the event Ent 2 occurs, namely g u t x t is queried to the random oracle H 2 . Note that the private key x t is never used to answer the adversary's queries. Therefore, Pr[Ent 2 ] is negligible based on the CDH assumption in G. Game 4 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 3 except that the challenge C * t is generated as follows. 
Analysis beyond the Security Model
In this section, we first describe offline message recovery attacks, which apply to not only FG-PKEET but also PKEET and AoN-PKEET by Yang et al. (2010); Tang (2011a) . Similar to the work by Tang (2011a), we show how to mitigate the attacks against the proposed FG-PKEET scheme in Section 3 by making use of computational puzzle schemes. Then, we present a variant of the proposed FG-PKEET cryptosystem to support approximate comparisons.
Offline Message Recovery Attack
Note that since a Type-I adversary has access to a token T i,t , then given a ciphertext Enc(M, P K t ) it can test whether M = M holds for any M by checking the following equality
Therefore, in the extreme situation when the actual message space M is polynomial size or the min-entropy of the message distribution is much lower than the security parameter, for FG-PKEET, a Type-I adversary (or, semi-trusted proxies) is capable of mounting an offline message recovery attack by checking every M ∈ M.
This type of attack is unavoidable due to the desired plaintext equality test functionality, similar to the offline keyword guessing attack in the case of PEKS (or searchable encryption) by Byun et al. (2006) ; Tang and Chen (2009) . However, compared with the formulation by Yang et al. (2010) , where any adversary can mount the attack, our formulation achieves a significant security improvement because a Type-II adversary is unable to mount the attack. Although an offline message recovery attack is theoretically unavoidable in the presence of a Type-I adversary, but, depending on the specific cryptosystem, certain countermeasure can be employed to mitigate such an attack. One possible countermeasure is shown as below.
As in the original cryptosystem proposed in Section 3, the enhanced cryptosystem requires the same global parameters, namely ( , G, g, p, H 1 ,ê, G 1 , G 2 , g 1 , g 2 , G T , q, H 2 , H 3 ).
In addition, Q · T , a puzzle hardness parameter L (detailed below), and a hash function UH : {0, 1} * → Z * Q·T are also published, where Q, T are two large primes. These additional parameters are required by the computational client puzzle scheme by Rivest et al. (1996) , which is employed because it is deterministic and immune to parallel attacks by Tang and Jeckmans (2010) . Note that the generation of Q · T could be bootstrapped by a party trusted by all users in the system, and threshold techniques (e.g. Boneh and Franklin (1997) ) can be used to improve the security. Nevertheless, this trust assumption is not required for achieving the existing security properties.
The algorithms KeyGen and Dec are identical to those in the original scheme, while the algorithms Enc is redefined as follows.
Compared with the original encryption and decryption algorithms, the main difference is in computing C (4) , where the encryptor needs to perform L multiplications in Z * Q·T in order to compute (UH(M )) 2 L mod Q · T to form C (4) . Let every user U i , for i ≥ 1, adopt the above public key encryption scheme, and U i 's key pair be denoted as (P K i , SK i ). The algorithms Aut is identical to that in the original cryptosystem, but the Com algorithm is defined as follows.
As to this enhanced cryptosystem, the existing properties still hold, and their security proofs remain exactly the same. If a proxy is given U t 's ciphertext Enc(M, P K t ) and token T i,t , then it can obtain
To test any M , the most efficient approach for the proxy is to compute (UH(M )) 2 L mod Q · T and perform a comparison based on its hash value. Since every test will cost L multiplications, then by setting an appropriate L the offline message recovery attack will be made computationally very expensive. Suppose that the size of the actual message space is not very small, this approach will deter the attack to some extent.
It is worth noting that, in this enhanced cryptosystem, the encryptor needs to perform L multiplications to mask the message in the encryption. This may be a computational bottleneck for some application scenarios. How to overcome this drawback while still mitigating the attack is an interesting future work.
Approximate Equality Test Support
Note that, throughout the paper, we have only talked about exact equality test. It is reasonable to assume that, in some application scenarios, users may want the proxy to perform some form of approximate test. In this paper, we focus on the following case: if the plaintext messages are considered as integers, how to enable the proxy to test whether |M i − M j | ≤ T , where T is an integer, given the ciphertexts for M i and M j . Note that approximate equality test based on other distance metrics may also be interesting, but we leave them for future work.
In the original FG-PKEET cryptosystem, the messages are hashed with H 3 so that there is no manipulation possible for the proxy to perform approximation test. We propose an variant cryptosystem, in which all algorithms remain the same except for Enc. Note that we treat messages as integers.
It is clear that the only difference is the computation of C (4) , which is defined to be g vy 1 · H 3 (M ) in the original scheme.
Recall from Section 3, the equality test algorithm of this variant cryptosystem is as follows.
2 ) Now, if the proxy wants to test whether
2 ) for any −T ≤ t ≤ T . With this variant, the proxy can perform other types of approximate equality tests, say testing whether M i = t · M j for any integer t.
It is true that the approximate equality test property could be very useful and necessary in some application scenarios. However, it should be noted that FG-PKEET cryptosystems with such a property may possess two vulnerabilities.
• The first one is offline message recovery attacks.
Due to the requirement that the proxy somehow needs to be able to manipulate some operations in the comparison, the countermeasure proposed in Section 4.1 cannot be applied any more. It remains as a challenge to find a countermeasure.
• Besides recovering the messages, the proxy can figure out more information about the plaintexts, i.e. the relationships between the plaintexts. Note that this is directly resulted from approximate equality test requirement, and it demonstrates a conflict between the desired functionality and the available security.
Comparisons of PKEET Primitives
In this section, we compare the functionalities and achieved security of three similar primitives, including the PKEET by Yang et al. (2010) , AoN-PKEET by Tang (2011a) , and FG-PKEET proposed in this paper.
Review of PKEET
According to its definition, a PKEET cryptosystem (depicted in Figure 5 ) consists of four algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Com), where (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) are similar to those of a standard public key encryption scheme and the Com algorithm allows any entity to compare two ciphertexts, which can be encrypted under a single user's public key or under two users' public keys respectively. As to security, for a user U t , all other entities are potential adversaries, who have the same privilege in the sense that nobody has additional secret from U t . As a result, a PKEET cryptosystem can only achieve OW-CCA security and it is naturally vulnerable to offline message recovery attacks, which can be mounted by any attacker. This means that a PKEET cryptosystem is weaker than an AoN-PKEET or an FG-PKEET cryptosystem from the security perspective.
As to the efficiency, a PKEET cryptosystem is clearly more efficient in the sense that the users do not need to explicitly authorize any proxy to enable the comparison, in contrast to the other two primitives.
With respect to the common algorithms, generally a PKEET cryptosystem should also be more efficiently than an AoN-PKEET or FG-PKEET cryptosystem. With respect to the cryptosystems PKEET by Yang et al. (2010) , AoN-PKEET by Tang (2011a) , and FG-PKEET proposed in Section 3, a rough complexity comparison of the Enc, Dec, Com algorithms are shown in Table 1 , where Exp means exponentiation.
Enc
Dec Note that the PKEET cryptosystem by Yang et al. (2010) uses Type 1 pairing, while the FG-PKEET cryptosystem proposed in Section 3 uses a Type 3 pairing mentioned by Boyen (2008) .
Review of AoN-PKEET
An AoN-PKEET cryptosystem consists of the same set of algorithms as that of FG-PKEET, where (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) are identical to those of FG-PKEET. Let all the potential users be denoted as
where N is an integer, and they adopt the above public key encryption scheme. For any i, suppose that U i 's key pair is denoted as (P K i , SK i ). The Aut and Com algorithms are defined as follows.
• Aut(SK i ): This algorithm takes the private key SK i as input and outputs a token T i .
• Com(C i , C j , T i , T j ): This algorithm takes two ciphertexts C i , C j and two tokens T i , T j as input, and outputs 1 if M i = M j or 0 otherwise. Note that C i , C j are two ciphertexts encrypted under P K i and P K j respectively, and T i , T j are the tokens from U i and U j respectively. As a special case, if the proxy wants to perform equality test between U i 's ciphertexts, it only needs T i to run Com.
With respect to an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem, for any honest user U t , where t ≥ 1, two types of adversaries are considered, as illustrated in Figure 6 . 1. Type-I adversary represents the semi-trusted proxies to which U t has assigned his token. In addition, this type of adversary has access to the ciphertexts of all users. Referring to Figure  6 , Proxy I and Proxy L are Type-I adversary. Against this type of adversary, OW-CCA security is defined, similar to that in Figure 2. 2. Type-II adversary represents all possibly malicious entities in the system from the perspective of U t . In contrast to Type-I adversary, this type of adversary only has access to the ciphertexts of all users. Referring to Figure 6 , such an adversary represents U i (i ≥ 1, i = t), the untrusted proxies and any other outsider. Against this type of adversary, IND-CCA security is defined, similar to that in Figure 4 .
In contrast to that of FG-PKEET, the Aut algorithm of AoN-PKEET only takes one private key as input, and the resulted token will enable the proxy to compare the user's ciphertexts to those of any other users. This implies that an AoN-PKEET cryptosystem has very coarse authorization capability, i.e. either giving full privilege or giving nothing to a proxy. As a result, the fine-grained authorization property defined in Figure 3 does not apply to AoN-PKEET.
FG-PKEET Cryptosystem in Two-Proxy Setting
Due to the nature of FG-PKEET, it is impossible to construct a cryptosystem which is immune to offline message recovery attacks and the caveat related to fine-grained authorization mentioned in Section 2.1. Therefore, we extend the concept of FG-PKEET into the two-proxy setting, where two semi-trusted proxies need to work together in order to perform a equality test. With respect to security, we assume that the semi-trusted proxies chosen by a user will not collude with each other. This is a standard assumption which has been used by many other threshold cryptographic primitives. For the simplicity of notation, we denote the new extended primitive as FG-PKEET + .
New Security Model in Two-Proxy Setting
Description of FG-PKEET + .
An FG-PKEET + cryptosystem consists of 5 algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec, Aut, Com), which are defined in the same way as for FG-PKEET, except for the Aut and Com algorithms.
Let all the potential users be denoted as
where N is an integer, and they adopt the above public key encryption scheme. For any i, suppose that U i 's key pair is denoted as (P K i , SK i ). Let all proxies be denoted as V x (1 ≤ x ≤ N ), where N is an integer.
For simplicity of description, we require that there is no overlap between the user set and the proxy set. Suppose that U i and U j want to enable two proxies V x and V y to perform equality test between their ciphertexts, the Aut and Com algorithms are defined as follows.
This algorithm is interactively run among U i , U j and two proxies V x and V y , and the two users use their private keys as their secret inputs while the proxies have no explicit input. At the end of the algorithm execution, proxy V x receives a token T x;i,j as the output and proxy V y receives a token T y;i,j as the output, while U i and U j receive no explicit output.
We require that i = j is allowed which means that a user want to authorize two proxies to perform equality test on his ciphertexts. But, x = y should always hold which implies a two-proxy setting.
• Com(C i , C j , T x;i,j ; T y;i,j ): This algorithm is interactively run between two proxies V x , V y , where C i , C j are the ciphertexts of U i and U j . At the end of the execution, the algorithm outputs 1 if M i = M j or 0 otherwise for both proxies.
Correctness of FG-PKEET + .
Similar to other cryptographic primitives, the basic requirement to FG-PKEET + is soundness. Informally, this property means that the algorithms Dec and Com work properly with valid inputs. Formally, it is defined as follows. and (T x;i,j , T y;i,j 
Security Model of FG-PKEET + .
For this new primitive, we make the same set of assumptions as we have made for FG-PKEET in Section 2. In addition, we assume that the semi-trusted proxies will not collude with each other. Note that this new assumption is only required for defining the fine-grained authorization property. Similar to FG-PKEET, with respect to an FG-PKEET + cryptosystem, for an honest user U t , where 1 ≤ t ≤ N , we consider two categories of adversaries, as illustrated in Figure 7. 1. Type-I adversary represents any semi-trusted proxy with which U t has run the algorithm Aut with. Referring to Figure 7 , Proxy x, y, or z is Type-I adversary. The difference with the definition of Type-I adversary for FG-PKEET is that we assume there no collusion between semitrusted proxies.
2. Type-II adversary represents all possibly malicious entities in the system from the perspective of
. This is identical to the definition of Type-II adversary for FG-PKEET. Compared with the OW-CCA definition for FG-PKEET, the main difference is that i = j is allowed in any Aut query. This reflects the fact that we take into account the fucntionality that a user needs to explicitly grant the authorization to proxies to perform equality test on his ciphertexts. Moreover, in the game, the adversary plays the role of both proxies in an Aut query. This implies that even if the proxies collude they cannot recover an encrypted message. It provides somewhat worst-case security guarantee. (a) Dec query with data C as input for the index i: the challenger returns Dec(C, SK i ).
(b) Aut query with two user indexes i, j and proxy indexes x, y as input: the challenger runs the Aut algorithm with the adversary which plays the role of proxies x, y. Note that i = j is allowed but x = y is not allowed.
At some point, the adversary asks the challenger for a challenge for an index t.
3. Challenge phase: The challenger chooses a message M t ∈ R M and sends C * t = Enc(M t , P K t ) to the adversary.
Phase 2:
The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle queries as in Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary's activities should adhere to the following restriction: The Dec oracle should not have been queried with the data C * t for the index t. At some point, the adversary terminates by outputting a guess M t . Compared with the fine-grained authorization property definition for FG-PKEET, the main difference is that i = j is allowed in any Aut query and t = w is allowed in the challenge. This reflects the fact that we take into account the functionality that a user need to explicitly grant proxies the authorization to perform equality test on his ciphertexts, i.e. a proxy cannot perform equality test on two ciphertexts of U i even if it has been authorized to perform equality test on two ciphertexts which are for U i and U j respectively.
As to the power of a Type-II adversary, it is involved in the executions of the Aut algorithm as the other user with U t , so that it may learn some information about U t 's private key. Moreover, it may also obtain some information about U t 's plaintexts through accessing U t 's decryption oracle. In the presence of a Type-II adversary, we define the standard IND-CCA security, which is identical to Definition 2.4, except for that an Aut oracle query involves two proxies which will be simulated by the challenger.
(b) Aut query with two user indexes i, j and proxy indexes x, y as input: the challenger runs the Aut algorithm with the adversary which plays the role of proxy x. Note that i = j is allowed but x = y is not allowed.
At some point, the adversary sends two integer indexes t, w to the challenger. In this phase, the Aut oracle should not have been queried with two integer indexes t, w.
Challenge phase:
The challenger randomly chooses two different messages M 0 , M 1 from M and a random bit b.
The adversary is allowed to issue the same types of oracle queries as in Phase 1. In this phase, the adversary's activities should adhere to the restriction described in Phase 1, together with the following one: The Dec oracle should not have been queried with the data C * t and index t or with the data C * w and index w. At some point, the adversary terminates by outputting a guess b . Figure 9 The Game for the Fine-grained Authorization Property
Description of the Proposed Cryptosystem
The Public Key Encryption Scheme.
The global parameters and the public key encryption algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) are defined as those of the FG-PKEET cryptosystem proposed in Section 3.1.
Suppose that every user U i , for 1 ≤ t ≤ N , adopts the above public key encryption scheme. To facilitate our description, we use the index i for all the variables in defining U i 's data. For example, U i 's key pair is denoted as (P K i , SK i ), where
where N is an integer.
3. Proxy V x computes X * j and Proxy V x computes X * i , where
i , g
4. Proxy V x and Proxy V x engages in a two-party protocol to compare X * i and X * j . At the end of the protocol, both proxies learn 1 if X * i = X * j and 0 otherwise. As a specifical case of integer comparison problem, there are many solutions available, say that by Freedman et al. (2004) .
As a special case of the above algorithm, if i = j and V x wants to compare C i and C i , then the Com algorithm is interactively run between V x and V y as follows. Let
) be written in the following form.
1. V x sends the messages C i , C i to V y , and they agree on the ciphertexts to perform equality test. If V y has not been authorized by U i , then it rejects V x 's request.
2. Proxy V x computes X i and sends r x · X i to proxy V y , where r x ∈ R G T . Proxy V y computes X i and sends r y · X i to proxy V x , where r y ∈ R G T .
3. Proxy V x computes X * i and Proxy V x computes X * i , where
4. Proxy V x and Proxy V x engage in a two-party protocol to compare X * i and X * i . At the end of the protocol, both proxies learn 1 if X * i = X * i and 0 otherwise.
From the description, it is straightforward to verify that the soundness property under Definition 6.1 is achieved.
Security Analysis
Note the fact that, for any i, j, the tokens T x;i,j and T y;i,j generated by the Aut algorithm proposed in Section 6.2.2 is a random division of the Token T i,j generated by the Aut algorithm proposed in Section 3.1.2. In other words, given T i,j , we can faithfully generate T x;i,j and T y;i,j . Therefore, with respect to the OW-CCA security property under Definition 6.2, a proof is identical to that of Theorem 1. Another fact about the Aut algorithm proposed in Section 6.2.2 is that U i and U j perform identically to the case in Section 3.1.2, regardless the trivial operation of dividing the values and assign them to two proxies. As a result, Therefore, with respect to the IND-CCA security property under Definition 2.4, a proof is identical to that of Theorem 3.
Next, we give a proof for the fine-grained authorization property according to Definition 6.3. Proof sketch. Suppose an adversary has the advantage in the attack game shown in Figure 9 . Now, we consider two cases of an execution of the attack game. One case is that t = w in the challenge. Based on the fact that, for any i, j, given T i,j we can faithfully generate T x;i,j and T y;i,j . In this case, the adversary's privilege in the game is no more than that in the game defined in Figure 3 . Therefore, based on Theorem 2, we have to be negligible.
Q. Tang
Now, we consider the other case where t = w in the attack game, and show that is also negligible. The security proof is done through a sequence of games by shoup (2006) .
Game 1 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 0 except that the following. For any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec with C i , the challenger computes Game 2 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that in Game 1 except that, for any index i, if the adversary queries the decryption oracle Dec with C i , the challenger does the following. Try to obtain the query to the oracle H 1 with the input C 
If such a query cannot be found, return ⊥. Otherwise, return M i . This game is indeed identical to Game 1 . Let 2 = Pr[b = b], then we have 2 = 1 . Game 3 : In this game, the challenger performs identically to that as in Game 2 except the following. The challenge C * t is generated as follows. The challenge C * t is generated as follows. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have reviewed the concepts of PKEET, AoN-PKEET, and FG-PKEET, and discussed their capabilities in authorizing users to control who can perform equality test on their ciphertexts and the available security guarantees. Our analysis has shown that offline message recovery attack is a security concern for all primitives, although only semi-trusted proxies can carry out the attack in the case of AoN-PKEET and FG-PKEET. To address the concern, we have proposed the concept of FG-PKEET + , namely FG-PKEET in two-proxy setting. The tradeoff is clear: an FG-PKEET + cryptosystem can prevent offline message recovery attacks but it is more expensive to carry out the test because it requires an interactive protocol between two proxies. When to choose which primitive to use is depending on the security and efficiency requirements of the specific application scenario. It is an interesting future work to further investigate this. Recall from Section 6, one of the motivations of the two-proxy setting is to mitigate the caveat that the proxy can test equality of U i 's ciphertexts, given a token T i,j . It remains as an interesting future work is to propose a FG-PKEET cryptosystem without this caveat, where the attack game for fine-grained authorization property is identical to that in Figure 3 except that i = j and t = w are allowed in the game.
